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Abstract
Invasive	alien	species	(IAS)	constitute	a	major	threat	to	global	biological	diversity.	In	
order	to	control	their	spread,	a	detailed	understanding	of	the	factors	influencing	their	
distribution	 is	 essential.	 Although	 international	 trade	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	 major	 force	
structuring	 spatial	 patterns	of	 IAS,	 the	 role	of	other	 social	 factors	 remains	unclear.	
Despite	studies	highlighting	the	importance	of	strong	governance	in	slowing	drivers	of	
biodiversity	 loss	 such	 as	 logging,	 deforestation,	 and	 agricultural	 intensification,	 no	
study	has	yet	analyzed	its	contribution	to	the	issue	of	IAS.	Using	estimates	of	govern-
ance	quality	and	comprehensive	spatiotemporal	IAS	data,	we	performed	multiple	lin-
ear	regressions	to	investigate	the	effect	of	governance	quality	upon	the	distribution	of	
species	 listed	under	 “100	of	 the	worst”	 IAS	 in	38	Eurasian	countries	as	defined	by	
DASIE.	Our	model	suggested	that	for	countries	with	higher	GDP,	stronger	governance	
was	associated	with	a	greater	number	of	the	worst	IAS;	in	contrast,	for	the	lowest	GDP	
countries	under	analysis,	stronger	governance	was	associated	with	fewer	of	these	IAS.	
We	 elucidate	 how	 the	 quality	 of	 governance	within	 a	 country	 has	 implications	 for	
trade,	 tourism,	 transport,	 legislation,	and	economic	development,	all	of	which	 influ-
ence	 the	 spread	 of	 IAS.	While	 our	 findings	 support	 the	 common	 assumption	 that	
strengthening	governance	benefits	conservation	interventions	in	countries	of	smaller	
economy,	we	find	that	this	effect	is	not	universal.	Stronger	governance	alone	cannot	
adequately	address	the	problem	of	 IAS,	and	targeted	action	 is	required	 in	relatively	
high-	GDP	countries	in	order	to	stem	the	influx	of	IAS	associated	with	high	volumes	of	
trade.
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1  | INTRODUCTION
Effective	prevention	and	control	of	 invasive	alien	species	 (IAS)	 re-
quire	 a	 thorough	 understanding	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	 invasion.	
The	 socioeconomic	 context	 of	 biological	 invasions	 is	 thought	 to	
be	well	 understood,	with	previous	 studies	highlighting	 the	 role	of	
international	trade	(Westphal,	Browne,	MacKinnon,	&	Noble,	2008)	
and	 globalization	 (Amano,	 Coverdale,	 &	 Peh,	 2016;	 Meyerson	 &	
Mooney,	2007).	One	socioeconomic	 factor	of	biological	 invasions,	
however,	 has	 not	 yet	 been	 addressed	 in	 this	 context.	 Despite	
an	 emerging	 literature	 examining	 the	 role	 of	 governance	 in	 is-
sues	 such	 as	 biodiversity	 loss	 (Smith,	Muir,	Walpole,	 Balmford,	 &	
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Leader-	Williams,	2003),	illegal	logging	(Smith,	Obidzinski,	Subarudi,	
&	 Suramenggala,	 2003),	 agricultural	 intensification	 (Ceddia,	
Bardsley,	 Gomez-	y-	Paloma,	 &	 Sedlacek,	 2014),	 and	 deforestation	
(Umemiya,	 Rametsteiner,	 &	 Kraxner,	 2010),	 there	 is	 a	 paucity	 of	
studies	considering	its	role	during	the	process	of	biological	invasion	
(Lotz	&	Allen,	2013).
Governance	 is	 defined	 as,	 “the	 traditions	 and	 institutions	 by	
which	 authority	 in	 a	 country	 is	 exercised”	 (Kaufmann,	 Kraay,	 &	
Mastruzzi,	 2011).	 Biodiversity	 conservation	 is	 intimately	 related	
to	 multiple	 aspects	 of	 governance.	 For	 example,	 corruption	 has	
been	 correlated	with	 changes	 in	 forest	 cover,	 numbers	 of	African	
elephants,	 and	 numbers	 of	 black	 rhinoceroses,	 illustrating	 that	
strong	 governance	 is	 essential	 to	 slowing	 the	 rate	 of	 biodiversity	
loss	(Smith,	Muir,	et	al.,	2003).	Similarly,	illegal	logging	in	Indonesia	
increased	during	political	 transitions,	when	governments	are	weak	
and	 have	 underdeveloped	 institutions,	 and	 thus	 more	 vulnerable	
to	 corruption	 (Smith,	 Obidzinski,	 et	al.,	 2003).	 In	 support	 of	 this,	
worsening	corruption	correlated	with	poorer	environmental	perfor-
mance	 across	 66	 tropical	 developing	 countries	worldwide	 (Peh	 &	
Drori,	2010),	and	increases	in	deforestation	rates	have	been	found	
to	associate	with	decreases	in	the	quality	of	governance	(Umemiya	
et	al.,	2010).
Besides	 control	 of	 corruption,	 there	 are	 other	 aspects	 of	 gover-
nance,	such	as	Political	Stability,	Voice	and	Accountability,	Government	
Effectiveness,	Regulatory	Quality,	and	Rule	of	Law	 (Kaufmann	et	al.,	
2011).	There	has	been	little	focus	to	date	on	what	role	these	aspects	
of	governance	play	in	the	distribution	of	IAS.	Only	one	previous	study	
has	briefly	explored	the	impact	of	governance	upon	invasive	species	
(Lotz	&	Allen,	2013),	finding	some	evidence	of	a	relationship	between	
Political	 Stability	 (as	 defined	 and	 estimated	 by	 Kaufmann,	 Kraay,	 &	
Mastruzzi,	2009)	and	the	prevalence	of	 invasive	birds	and	mammals	
in	100	countries	worldwide.	But	 in	other	environmental	studies,	po-
litical	instability,	in	combination	corruption,	has	been	found	to	reduce	
the	stringency	of	environmental	regulations	(Fredriksson	&	Svensson,	
2003).	 Likewise,	 stronger	democracy—through	 its	protection	of	 free	
speech	and	its	capacity	to	hold	leaders	accountable—has	been	shown	
to	 reduce	 aquatic	 pollution,	 deforestation,	 and	 land	 degradation	 (Li	
&	Reuveny,	 2006),	whilst	 increasing	 protected	 land	 area	 (Midlarsky,	
1998).
Whether	 stronger	governance	plays	 a	beneficial	 role	 concerning	
IAS	remains	unknown.	In	this	study,	we	used	cross-	country	estimates	
on	 the	 quality	 of	 governance	 in	 conjunction	 with	 comprehensive	
Eurasian	IAS	data	to	explore	the	role	of	governance	in	structuring	the	
distribution	of	the	100	“worst”’	(i.e.,	most	severe)	IAS	for	38	Eurasian	
countries,	 as	 defined	 by	 DASIE.	 Increased	 trade	 and	 economic	 de-
velopment	have	been	shown	to	correlate	with	more	heavily	 invaded	
countries	(Pyšek	et	al.,	2010;	Westphal	et	al.,	2008).	We	hypothesized	
that	stronger	governance—through	its	ability	to	foster	a	society	which	
enforces	environmental	laws	and	can	effectively	monitor	and	regulate	
IAS—acts	to	mitigate	the	effect	of	trade	on	introducing	damaging	IAS	
between	economically	developed	countries.	In	contrast,	economically	
equivalent	 countries	 with	 comparatively	 poorer	 governance	 would	
suffer	relatively	more	invasions.
2  | METHODS
2.1 | Governance data
Indicators	 for	 six	 dimensions	 of	 governance	were	 taken	 from	 the	
Worldwide	 Governance	 Indicators	 Project	 (WGI).	 These	 six	 ag-
gregate	 indicators	 are	 weighted	 averages	 of	 data	 collated	 from	
hundreds	of	 individual	variables	measuring	governance	worldwide	
(Kaufmann	et	al.,	2011),	making	them	a	comprehensive	measure	of	
governance.	The	six	 indicators	are	 (adapted	from	Kaufmann	et	al.,	
2011)	as	follows:
1. Voice	and	Accountability—freedom	of	expression	and	 the	extent	
to	 which	 citizens	 participate	 in	 government	 matters.
2. Political	Stability	and	Absence	of	Violence—the	likelihood	of	politi-
cal	instability	and	terrorism.
3. Government	Effectiveness—the	quality	of	policy	 formulation	and	
implementation.
4. Regulatory	Quality—the	quality	of	private	sector	regulation.
5. Rule	of	 Law—the	extent	 to	which	people	 trust	 and	abide	by	 the	
rules	 of	 society,	 including	 the	 quality	 of	 contract	 enforcement,	
property	rights,	the	police,	and	the	courts.
6. Control	of	Corruption—the	extent	to	which	public	power	is	exer-
cised	for	private	gain.
The	concept	of	“invasion	debt”—in	which	current	patterns	of	
IAS	richness	are	better	described	by	historical	 rather	 than	mod-
ern	 socioeconomic	 data	 (Essl	 et	al.,	 2011)—suggests	 that	 con-
temporary	 indicators	 are	 unsuitable	 for	 this	 analysis	 because	
they	fail	to	reflect	governance	at	the	time	of	an	introduction.	We	
therefore	 first	 explored	whether	 the	 relative	 rank	 of	 countries’	
governance	changed	over	 time.	While	WGI	only	began	 in	1996,	
changes	 in	WGI	 estimates	 from	 2000	 to	 2009	 are	 small	world-
wide	 (Kaufmann	et	al.,	2011),	and	from	1998	to	2008,	 just	29%	
of	 countries	 under	our	 analysis	 showed	 significant	 changes	 in	 a	
single	aggregate	indicator	(Kaufmann	et	al.,	2009),	indicating	that	
governance	 estimates	 are	 surprisingly	 static	 over	 short	 times-
cales.	As	evidence,	WGI	estimates	from	1996	were	compared	to	
2012	 estimates	 using	 Spearman’s	 rank	 correlation	 tests.	 For	 all	
six	WGI	indicators,	1996	estimates	strongly	correlated	with	those	
in	2012	(Figure	1),	confirming	that	governance	data	are	relatively	
stable	over	time.
To	support	this	assumption	across	longer	timescales	and	through-
out	major	changes	in	the	Eurasian	political	landscape,	we	confirmed	this	
result	using	an	older,	alternative	governance	index:	the	International	
Country	Risk	Guide.	Data	 for	 the	 ICRG’s	 Political	 Risk	Ratings	 (PRS	
Group)	are	available	since	1984.	The	ICRG	is	the	earliest,	publicly	avail-
able	governance	indicator,	representing	an	upper	limit	on	the	histor-
ical	availability	of	governance	estimates	 (Kaufmann	et	al.,	2009).	For	
each	country,	earliest	available	annual	mean	ratings	were	compared	to	
mean	scores	from	2012	using	Spearman’s	correlations;	former	nations	
were	 compared	 against	modern	 counterparts	 (e.g.,	 Slovakia	 and	 the	
Czech	Republic	were	matched	 against	Czechoslovakia).	 Scores	 from	
1984	 to	 1986	were	 significantly	 correlated	with	 ratings	 from	 2013	
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(rs	=	.697,	n	=	31,	p	<	.001),	reinforcing	the	description	of	governance	
estimates	as	time-	invariant.	This	assumption	of	time	invariance	in	gov-
ernance	has	similarly	been	justified	in	a	previous	study	of	governance	
and	 biodiversity	 (Ceddia	 et	al.,	 2014),	 further	 increasing	 our	 confi-
dence	in	this	instance.
Numerous	 studies	 within	 the	 governance-	biodiversity	 literature	
have	analyzed	individual	WGI	indicators,	and	it	is	clear	that	there	are	
benefits	of	having	insight	 into	how	individual	aspects	of	governance	
interrelate	 with	 biodiversity	 (Ceddia	 et	al.,	 2014;	 Eklund,	 Arponen,	
Visconti,	&	Cabeza,	2011;	Lotz	&	Allen,	2013).	As	such,	we	analyzed	
F IGURE  1 Governance	estimates	from	1996	to	2012	in	six	aggregate	indicators	(a–f)	were	examined	using	Spearman’s	rank	correlation	tests	
(rs).	In	all	six	indicators,	estimates	from	1996	were	correlated	with	estimates	from	2012.	(a)	Corruption:	rs	=	.931.	(b)	Rule	of	Law:	rs	=	.947.	(c)	
Political	Stability:	rs	=	.875.	(d)	Government	Effectiveness:	rs	=	.940.	(e)	Regulatory	Quality:	rs	=	.908.	(f)	Voice	and	Accountability:	rs	=	.932.	In	all	
correlations,	n	=	38,	p < .001
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individual	WGI	 indicators	 separately,	 as	well	 as	 an	 overall	 score	 for	
governance.	As	in	a	previous	study	(Umemiya	et	al.,	2010),	an	overall	
governance	score	(from	0	[low]	to	30	[high])	was	calculated	by	sum-
ming	mean	scores	during	the	period	1996–2012	for	all	six	indicators,	
and	setting	these	values	relative	to	zero.	Lower	scores	correspond	to	
relatively	 weaker	 governance;	 higher	 scores	 correspond	 to	 relative	
stronger	governance.
2.2 | Alien species data
Invasive	alien	species	introduced	into	Eurasia	prior	to	1952	were	ex-
cluded	from	the	analysis.	The	earliest	international	treaty	targeting	IAS	
in	Eurasia	was	the	1951	International	Plant	Protection	Convention,	in	
force	since	1952	(Genovesi	&	Shine,	2003).	Although	governance	con-
stitutes	more	 than	 legislation,	 the	existence	of	 legislation	and	com-
pliance	to	it	encompasses	numerous	aspects	of	governance	including	
Rule	of	Law,	Government	Effectiveness,	Control	of	Corruption,	and	
Regulatory	Quality.	The	existence	of	 legislation	 is	 therefore	 a	 good	
indicator	that	intentional	governance	mechanisms	were	in	existence	in	
relation	to	IAS.	The	international	treaty	is	a	good	cross-	country	indica-
tor	of	the	intention	to	govern	as	it	establishes	that	in	1952	Eurasian	
nations	 were	 aware	 of	 IAS	 and	 had	 policy	 in	 place	 to	 target	 IAS.	
Therefore,	any	new	introductions	post-	1952	have	the	potential	to	be	
influenced	by	governance.	Introductions	prior	to	1952	were	therefore	
excluded	 from	 the	 study,	 since	 these	would	 have	 occurred	 outside	
a	timeframe	in	which	it	would	be	guaranteed	that	governance	could	
have	had	any	intentional	effect.
We	are	aware	that	 including	all	species	that	have	been	recorded	
since	1952	undoubtedly	means	 that	 some	 species	 recorded	 arrived	
before	the	convention	was	in	place,	due	to	the	lag	between	arriving	
and	recording	of	invasive	species	(Jeschke	&	Strayer,	2005;	Kowarik,	
1995).	Nevertheless,	as	the	lag	time	is	both	highly	variable	and	unpre-
dictable	(Jeschke	&	Strayer,	2005;	Kowarik,	1995),	we	felt	this	was	the	
best	strategy	for	capturing	all	the	species	introduced	after	the	conven-
tion	came	into	force.
Data	 on	 IAS	 were	 collated	 from	 the	 DAISIE	 European	 Invasive	
Alien	Species	Gateway	 (http://www.europe-aliens.org).	Although	the	
most	comprehensive	IAS	database	for	Eurasia	(including	non-	European	
countries	such	as	Russia,	Israel,	and	Turkey),	country-	specific	informa-
tion	on	the	timing	of	introductions	for	most	species	is	either	poor	or	
absent.	It	was	therefore	not	possible	to	analyze	governance	in	relation	
to	 total	 IAS	 richness	 per	 country.	However,	DAISIE	 provides	 exten-
sive	 information,	 including	known	arrival	dates	for	each	country,	 for	
a	subset	of	IAS	identified	by	DAISIE	as	being	“100	of	the	worst”	IAS	
in	Eurasia	 in	terms	of	their	severely	negative	 impact	on	biodiversity,	
economy,	and	public	health.	This	dataset	 (hereinafter	 “DAISIE	100”)	
informs	about	the	distribution	of	the	100	worst	IAS	in	Eurasia.
The	DAISIE	100	represents	species	from	a	broad	suite	of	taxa	and	
habitats,	including	18	terrestrial	plants,	16	terrestrial	invertebrates,	15	
terrestrial	vertebrates,	16	inland	water	species,	three	terrestrial	fungi,	
and	32	species	from	coastal	waters,	thereby	representing	all	main	tax-
onomic	 groups	 and	 all	 environments	 (Vilà	 et	al.,	 2009).	DAISIE	 100	
species	 pose	 significantly	 severe	 threats	 to	 biodiversity:	 71%	 are	
recorded	 to	have	 reduced	native	biodiversity	or	altered	 the	 invaded	
community,	and	19%	have	threatened	endangered	species	(Vilà	et	al.,	
2009).	Therefore,	despite	the	absence	of	country-	specific	information	
on	their	 impacts,	the	DAISIE	100	is	a	suitable	proxy	for	the	invasive	
richness	in	a	country,	especially	since	the	number	of	100	worst	spe-
cies	per	country	correlates	with	total	IAS	richness	(rs	=	.730,	p	<	.001,	
n	=	38).	As	not	all	countries	have	coastal	areas,	marine	species	are	a	
potential	source	of	bias	and	were	therefore	excluded	from	the	anal-
ysis,	 leaving	 68	 species.	 For	 each	 country,	 a	DAISIE	 100	 score	was	
calculated	by	counting	the	number	of	species	on	the	“100	worst”	list	
introduced	 from	 1952	 onwards,	 excluding	 marine	 species.	 Higher	
scores	indicate	countries	have	more	invasions.
2.3 | Explanatory variables
Thirteen	 explanatory	 variables,	 including	 governance,	 were	 consid-
ered	to	account	for	factors	known	to	influence	the	distribution	of	IAS.	
(Hayes	&	Barry,	2008),	and	thus,	their	inclusion	in	the	model	was	war-
ranted.	One	explanatory	variable	was	governance,	both	as	an	overall	
governance	score	and	as	six	separate	indicators.
Of	the	12	remaining	explanatory	variables,	three	captured	climatic	
factors,	since	climate	matching	between	native	and	introduced	ranges	
is	 important	 in	 determining	 the	 distribution	 of	 invasive	 mammals	
(Forsyth,	Duncan,	Bomford,	&	Moore,	2004);	reptiles	and	amphibians	
(Bomford	et	al.	2009);	fish	(Bomford	et	al.	2010);	plants,	insects,	shell-
fish,	and	 finfish.	A	 further	 four	variables	captured	economic	 factors,	
because	economic	activity	is	well	studied	as	a	driver	of	the	prolifera-
tion	of	exotic	species	(Taylor	&	Irwin,	2004).	The	final	five	explanatory	
variables	captured	natural	and	human	geographies	which	also	shape	
the	dynamics	of	IAS.
These	12	explanatory	variables,	and	the	 justification	for	their	 in-
clusion,	are	listed	here:
1. Area	(km2,	Central	Intelligence	Agency	2014)	is	a	strong	predictor	
of	 IAS	 richness	 per	 country	 (McGeoch	 et	al.,	 2010).
2. Continentality	(difference	in	mean	January	and	June	temperature,	
°C;	Mitchell,	Carter,	Jones,	Hulme,	&	New,	2004)	was	expected	to	
correlate	negatively	with	the	worst	IAS:	lower	annual	variability	in	
temperature	might	give	IAS	a	stronger	likelihood	of	finding	the	cli-
mate	favorable	for	establishment.
3. Mean	annual	precipitation	(mm;	Mitchell	et	al.,	2004)	and
4. Mean	annual	temperature	(°C;	Mitchell	et	al.,	2004)	has	been	previ-
ously	found	to	determine	IAS	richness	(Lambdon	et	al.,	2008).
5. Insularity	(island	=	1;	mainland	=	0)	affects	the	distribution	of	IAS,	
since	 islands	 are	 typically	 more	 heavily	 invaded	 than	 mainland	
(Simberloff,	1995).
6. Human	Population	(The	World	Bank,	2013)	and
7. Human	Population	Density	 (people/km2	of	 land	area,	The	World	
Bank,	2013)	are	known	to	account	for	IAS	richness	across	countries	
(McKinney,	2006;	Pyšek	et	al.,	2010)	and	were	therefore	included	
in	our	model.
8. Road	 Density	 (km	 road/100	km2	 of	 land	 area,	 The	World	 Bank,	
2013)	facilitates	the	dispersal	of	IAS	(Hulme	2009.	For	example,	the	
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extent	of	terrestrial	transport	networks	accounted	for	the	density	
of	 alien	 plants	 in	 European	 and	 North	 African	 countries	 (Vilà	 &	
Pujadas,	2001),	justifying	its	inclusion	in	the	analysis.
9. GDP	(US$,	The	World	Bank,	2013)	positively	associates	with	the	
number	 of	 invasive	 plants,	 birds,	 fish,	 and	 mammals	 in	 Europe	
(Hulme,	2007).
10. GDP	per	capita	(US,	The	World	Bank,	2013)	has	accounted	for	the	
global	spread	of	invasive	birds,	and	mammals	(Lotz	&	Allen,	2013).
11. Merchandise	Imports	(US$,	The	World	Bank,	2013)	has	been	previ-
ously	used	in	IAS	studies	to	capture	the	extent	of	a	country’s	par-
ticipation	in	international	trade	(Westphal	et	al.,	2008).	Trade	has	
been	shown	to	account	for	global	patterns	in	IAS	(Westphal	et	al.,	
2008).
12. The	KOF	Index	of	Globalisation	reflects	the	economic,	political,	and	
social	 dimensions	 of	 globalization	 for	 a	 country	 (Dreher,	 2006).	
Globalization	is	argued	to	be	accelerating	the	rate	of	biological	inva-
sion	worldwide	and	thus	merits	inclusion	in	our	analysis	(Meyerson	
&	Mooney,	2007).
Direct	measures	of	ecosystem	disturbance,	which	are	known	to	facil-
itate	the	establishment	of	IAS	(Lozon	&	MacIsaac,	1997),	have	not	been	
included.	 Although	 percentage	 agricultural	 land	 has	 been	 previously	
used	as	a	measure	of	habitat	disturbance	 (Lotz	&	Allen,	2013),	only	a	
small	proportion	of	species	used	to	calculate	DAISIE	100	scores	were	
found	 in	 agricultural	 habitats	 (29%),	making	 it	 unsuitable	 to	use	here.	
Furthermore,	GDP	has	been	previously	used	as	a	proxy	for	disturbance	
(Westphal	et	al.,	2008),	suggesting	it	will	be	accounted	for	in	our	models	
indirectly.
2.4 | Statistical analysis
Before	constructing	the	global	model,	explanatory	variables	in	the	multi-
ple	linear	regressions	were	examined	for	collinearity	with	Pearson’s	tests	
(Table	S1).	The	less-	informative	parameter	of	strongly	correlated	vari-
ables	(r	>	.7	or	<	−.7)	was	eliminated.	GDP	correlated	with	Merchandise	
Imports	(r	=	.951,	p	<	.001)	and	Human	Population	(r	=	.925,	p	<	.001);	
as	these	were	also	correlated	with	each	other	(r	=	.846,	p	<	.001),	both	
were	excluded	from	the	analysis.	As	Merchandise	Imports	is	an	indica-
tion	of	trade,	which	is	known	to	dictate	the	spread	of	IAS,	a	reanaly-
sis	of	the	model	using	Merchandise	Imports	 instead	of	GDP	was	still	
performed	to	verify	the	findings.	Governance	correlated	with	GDP	per	
capita	 (r	=	.903,	p	<	.001)	and	Globalisation	 (r	=	.766,	p	<	.001);	 these	
two	variables	were	therefore	removed.
Response	variables	in	regressions	were	DAISIE	100	scores.	Area,	
Human	Population	Density,	and	Road	Density	were	 log-	transformed	
and	centered	to	zero	mean	to	satisfy	regression	assumptions.	An	in-
teraction	 term	 (GDP	×	Governance)	was	 also	 included	 in	 this	 global	
model	 after	 GDP	 and	 Governance	 were	 centered	 to	 zero	 mean.	
Diagnostic	plots	confirmed	that	assumptions	of	linear	regression	were	
not	violated.
Models	 for	 all	 possible	 parameter	 subsets	 were	 compared	 in	
terms	of	parsimony	and	prediction	on	the	basis	of	Akaike	Information	
Criterion	(Akaike,	1973)	using	the	function	“dredge”	within	the	package	
MuMIn	(Bartoń,	2014)	in	R	(R	Core	Team	2014).	AICc	was	used	since	
n/K	<	40	(Johnson	&	Omland,	2004).	The	difference	in	the	AICc	values	
between	the	top	model	and	other	models	was	calculated	(∆i).	Models	
were	ranked	in	order	of	increasing	∆i.	Models	with	∆i	<	6	were	consid-
ered	the	“best”	set	of	models	(Symonds	&	Moussalli,	2011).
For	 graphical	 analysis,	 countries	 were	 categorized	 by	 GDP	 ac-
cording	to	Ward’s	minimum	variance	method	 in	R,	which	maximized	
the	Euclidean	distance	between	each	cluster.	This	process	separated	
countries	into	categories	based	on	natural	breaks	in	the	data,	creating	
robust,	internally	consistent	categories,	and	reducing	the	likelihood	of	
results	arising	due	to	poor	discretization.
The	 absence	 of	 spatial	 autocorrelation	 in	 our	model	was	 deter-
mined	using	the	R	package	ncf	 (Bjornstad,	2013).	Moran’s	 I	was	cal-
culated	 at	250-	km	 intervals	 from	 the	 residuals	 of	 the	 global	model.	
Values	were	between	−0.4	and	0.3	for	all	distances	up	to	5,000	km,	
and	showed	no	overall	trend,	suggesting	no	significant	spatial	autocor-
relation.	Spatial	autoregressive	models	were	therefore	not	used.
3  | RESULTS
3.1 | Overall governance score
Model	 selection	 showed	 that	 no	 single	model	 was	 overwhelmingly	
supported	by	the	data	(∆i <	6,	Table	1).	GDP,	Governance,	and	their	in-
teraction	appeared	in	the	best	model,	as	well	as	eight	of	the	10	models	
with	∆i	<	6	(Table	1).	The	estimated	coefficients	of	these	three	terms	
were	 positive,	 and	 their	 95%	 confidence	 intervals	 did	 not	 overlap	
zero	in	seven	of	10	models	with	∆i	<	6	(Table	1).	R
2	values	were	con-
sistently	high	across	all	 top	models	 (Table	1),	suggesting	parameters	
within	this	set	explained	much	of	the	variance	in	DAISIE	100	scores.	
Area,	Population	Density,	and	Insularity	did	not	consistently	appear	in	
the	top	models	(Table	1).
Using	hierarchical	cluster	analysis,	 four	categories	of	country	or-
dered	 by	 increasing	 wealth	 as	 measured	 by	 GDP	 were	 identified.	
These	 categories	 are	 as	 follows:	 Lower	 (L;	 US$11–145bn),	 Middle	 
(M;	US$186–416bn),	Upper-	Middle	(UM;	US$690–793bn),	and	Upper	
(U;	US$1.8–3.2trn).
These	groupings	were	used	to	plot	Figure	2.	The	 interaction	be-
tween	Governance	and	GDP	was	a	significant	determinant	of	variation	
in	DAISIE	100	scores	(Figure	2),	appearing	in	eight	of	the	10	best	mod-
els	(∆i <	6,	Table	1).	Surprisingly,	the	relationship	between	DAISIE	100	
scores	and	governance	was	positive	for	Eurasian	countries	with	higher	
GDP,	suggesting	that,	ceteris	paribus,	increases	in	governance	associ-
ated	with	more	severe	invasions.	Contrastingly,	for	low-GDP	Eurasian	
countries	(L	group	nations),	better	governance	might	do	the	opposite,	
as	it	associated	with	reduced	DAISIE	100	scores	(Figure	2).
3.2 | Separate governance indicators
In	order	to	examine	whether	any	specific	aspect	of	governance	as-
sociated	with	IAS,	the	analysis	was	repeated	replacing	overall	gov-
ernance	scores	with	each	of	the	six	indicators	(Table	2).	Voice	and	
Accountability,	 Political	 Stability,	 Regulatory	 Quality,	 and	 Rule	 of	
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Law	returned	similar	results	to	the	original	regression	that	used	an	
overall	governance	score,	with	the	interaction	term	appearing	in	the	
top	models	 (Tables	2	 and	 S2–S5).	 Government	 Effectiveness	 and	
Control	 of	 Corruption	 also	 appeared	 in	 their	 most	 parsimonious	
models	but	were	not	as	strong	predictors,	as	they	were	not	included	
in	as	many	of	the	top	models	(Tables	S6	and	S7).	Based	on	the	AIC	
of	 the	best	model,	Political	Stability	and	Voice	and	Accountability	
were	the	best	predictors	of	the	distribution	of	IAS,	of	the	six	aspects	
of	governance	(Table	2).
As	a	robustness	test	to	confirm	the	validity	of	using	GDP	instead	
of	Merchandise	Imports	as	a	proxy	for	trade,	the	model	was	rerun	with	
Merchandise	Imports	as	an	explanatory	variable.	This	also	showed	that	
Governance	and	the	interaction	term	appeared	in	the	best	model,	sug-
gesting	that	using	GDP	instead	of	Merchandise	Imports	did	not	affect	
the	findings	(Table	S8).
4  | DISCUSSION
Whilst	many	studies	have	considered	the	socioeconomic	factors	influ-
encing	the	distribution	of	IAS	(Essl	et	al.,	2011;	McGeoch	et	al.,	2010;	
Pyšek	et	al.,	2010;	Westphal	et	al.,	2008),	our	study	explores	this	re-
lationship	between	governance	and	IAS	distribution	in	greater	detail.	
The	 result	 of	 our	 study	 clearly	 shows	 the	 importance	 of	 countries’	
governance	as	well	as	GDP	in	explaining	invasive	species	distributions.
Our	finding	that	stronger	governance	is	associated	with	the	intro-
duction	of	IAS	in	Eurasian	countries	with	higher	GDP	stands	in	sharp	
contrast	with	much	of	 the	 governance-	biodiversity	 literature,	which	
typically	 regards	poor	governance	as	a	 threat	 to	biodiversity	 (Smith,	
Muir,	et	al.,	2003;	Smith,	Obidzinski,	et	al.,	2003).	An	intuitive	explana-
tion	as	to	why	our	results	for	Eurasian	nations	with	higher	GDP	contrast	
with	this	body	of	literature	is	that	governance	was	a	further	indirect	
proxy	of	propagule	pressure—a	measure	of	the	number	and	frequency	
of	individuals	released	into	an	area	to	which	they	are	not	indigenous	
(Lockwood,	Cassey,	&	Blackburn,	2005).	Propagule	pressure	 is	a	key	
determinant	of	invasion	success,	being	the	most	important	factor	de-
termining	exotic	bird	species	richness	across	Europe	(Chiron,	Shirley,	
&	Kark,	 2009)	 and	exotic	 avian	establishment	 success	 across	41	 is-
land	systems	worldwide	(Cassey,	Blackburn,	Duncan,	&	Gaston,	2005).	
Governance	might	increase	propagule	pressure	through	its	beneficial	
effects	on	trade.	A	country’s	trade	increases	when	the	quality	of	legal	
and	 economic	 institutions	 is	 strengthened	 (Anderson	&	Marcouiller,	
2002).	 In	 turn,	 increased	 trade	boosts	 the	 rate	 at	which	propagules	
are	 introduced,	 causing	 more	 biological	 invasions	 (Westphal	 et	al.,	
2008).	Nevertheless,	 as	 trade	was	 included	 in	 the	model,	 either	 di-
rectly	or	through	the	representation	of	GDP	(see	Methods),	an	effect	
on	the	volume	of	trade	cannot	alone	have	resulted	with	the	effect	of	
	governance	found	in	our	models.
In	accordance	with	our	findings,	there	are	many	examples	of	gov-
ernance	 facilitating	 trade	 to	 the	detriment	of	controlling	 IAS.	World	
Trade	 Organization	 agreements	 help	 tackle	 corruption	 and	 foster	
stronger	 governance,	 thus	 improving	 international	 trade	 (Aaronson	
&	Abouharb,	 2013);	 but	 agreements	 generally	 lack	 the	mechanisms	
to	internalize	the	externalities	of	IAS	spread	through	trade	(Perrings,	
Dehnen-	Schmutz,	 Touza,	 &	 Williamson,	 2005).	 Likewise,	 EU	 trade	
agreements	 are	 upheld	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 controlling	 IAS:	 in	 1989,	
Germany	banned	the	 import	of	 live	European	freshwater	crayfish	 in	
order	 to	 halt	 the	 spread	 of	 invasive	 crayfish	 plague	 (Aphanomyces 
astaci	 [Schikora	 1906]),	 but	 the	 European	 Commission	 successfully	
argued	that	this	law	amounted	to	a	“disguised	restriction	upon	trade”	
within	 the	 EU	 and	 was	 thus	 not	 permissible	 (Commission	 of	 the	
European	Communities	v	Federal	Republic	of	Germany,	1994).	In	such	
ways,	strong	governance	and	trade	can	interact	to	facilitate	the	spread	
of	IAS	within	Eurasian	countries	with	higher	GDP.
Human	movement	unrelated	to	trade	also	spread	IAS.	For	exam-
ple,	 the	worldwide	airline	transportation	network	has	allowed	 inter-
connections	between	geographically	disparate	but	climatically	similar	
regions,	facilitating	biological	invasions	(Tatem	&	Hay,	2007).	Although	
Road	Density	 failed	 to	appear	 in	 the	 set	of	 top	models,	other	 stud-
ies	 suggest	 road	 networks	 contribute	 to	 the	 spread	 of	 IAS	 (Vilà	 &	
TABLE  1 Best	models	(∆I <	6)	predicting	DAISIE	100	scores	in	Eurasian	countries
Model rank Intercept Gov:GDP Governance GDP Area Insularity PopDen Road density Continentality Precipitation Temperature K Log- likelihood AICc ∆i Adj. R
2
1 10.67	±	1.21 4.98	±	2.83 4.87	±	4.49 2.94	±	0.79 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 4 −101.20 214.3 0 0.667
2 11.11	±	1.35 4.99	±	2.79 5.71	±	4.59 2.72	±	0.84 NA + NA NA NA NA NA 5 −100.07 214.9 0.59 0.677
3 10.69	±	1.21 4.43	±	3.04 4.60	±	4.52 2.89	±	0.80 NA NA 0.60	±	1.20 NA NA NA NA 5 −100.61 215.9 1.67 0.668
4 11.17	±	1.35 4.34	±	2.98 5.48	±	4.58 2.63	±	0.85 NA + 0.70	±	1.18 NA NA NA NA 6 −99.23 216.2 1.92 0.681
5 10.68	±	1.22 4.71	±	2.92 3.80	±	5.17 3.35	±	1.24 −0.49	±	1.15 NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 −100.77 216.3 1.99 0.665
6 11.13	±	1.36 4.70	±	2.87 4.59	±	5.21 3.15	±	1.26 −0.52	±	1.13 + NA NA NA NA NA 6 −99.56 216.9 2.59 0.676
7 11.44	±	1.40 NA 10.44	±	4.84 NA 2.78	±	0.93 + 3.98	±	1.35 NA NA NA NA 5 −101.75 218.2 3.95 0.647
8 11.27	±	1.37 3.66	±	3.42 8.73	±	9.07 0.95	±	4.14 1.79	±	4.30 + 2.51	±	4.52 NA NA NA NA 7 −98.79 218.5 4.28 0.679
9 10.70	±	1.23 4.11	±	3.47 6.10	±	8.76 2.10	±	4.02 0.86	±	4.27 NA 1.46	±	4.46 NA NA NA NA 6 −100.51 218.8 4.49 0.659
10 10.84	±	1.29 NA 9.88	±	4.98 NA 3.07	±	0.90 NA 4.15	±	1.49 NA NA NA NA 5 −103.68 219.2 4.97 0.621
Models	ranked	by	increasing	AICc.	Coefficient	estimates	and	95%	CI	shown.	Gov:GDP,	Governance-	GDP	interaction;	PopDen,	Population	Density;	 
K,	Number	of	fitted	parameters	(including	intercept	and	residual	variance);	∆I,	Difference	between	AICc	value	of	the	best	model	and	other	models;	 
Adj. R2,	Coefficient	of	determination,	adjusted	for	the	number	of	parameters.
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Pujadas,	 2001).	 Poor	 governance	might	 reduce	 travel	 to	 that	 coun-
try,	 potentially	 explaining	 why	 better	 governance	 associated	 with	
increased	DAISIE	100	scores	in	certain	countries.	Political	instability,	
human	 rights	 violations,	 conflict,	 and	 terrorism	 can	 harm	 a	 nation’s	
tourism	 industry	 (Neumayer,	 2004).	 In	 contrast,	 Europe’s	 Schengen	
Treaty—which	guarantees	free	human	movement	between	signatory	
countries—might	be	facilitating	the	spread	of	IAS	(Cobo,	Vieira-	Lanero,	
Rego,	&	Servia,	2010),	but	its	existence	depends	upon	strong	gover-
nance	in	member	nations.
Our	analysis	investigated	a	type	of	governance	that	has	been	termed	
“conventional	 governance”	 (Ceddia	 et	al.,	 2014).	However,	 there	 is	 a	
growing	appreciation	of	 an	alternative	 form	of	governance—environ-
mental	governance,	defined	as,	“the	rules,	practices,	policies,	and	insti-
tutions	that	shape	how	humans	interact	with	the	environment”	(UNEP	
2010).	A	 study	modeling	 the	 role	of	 governance	 in	 determining	pat-
terns	of	land	use	change	under	agricultural	intensification	in	six	South	
American	countries	in	1970–2006	found	that	these	two	forms	of	gov-
ernance	 led	 to	alternative	outcomes	 for	biodiversity:	Higher	conven-
tional	governance	scores	led	to	spatial	expansion	of	agricultural	 land,	
whereas	higher	environmental	governance	scores	(as	measured	by	the	
Environmental	Performance	Index	[EPI]	and	the	area	of	protected	land)	
were	associated	with	land-	sparing	forms	of	agricultural	intensification	
(Ceddia	et	al.,	2014).	Strong	conventional	governance	did	not	equate	
to	strong	environmental	governance,	because	the	former	reflects	the	
“conditions	 necessary	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 operational	 markets,	
rather	than	environmental	protection	per	se”	(Ceddia	et	al.,	2014).
The	differentiation	between	conventional	and	environmental	gov-
ernance	offers	a	novel	perspective	on	previous	studies	associating	high	
corruption	with	poor	environmental	performance	(Peh	&	Drori,	2010;	
Smith,	 Muir,	 et	al.,	 2003;	 Smith,	 Obidzinski,	 et	al.,	 2003;	 Umemiya	
et	al.,	2010)	and	instead	suggests	that	strong	conventional	governance	
can	 go	 hand	 in	 hand	with	 environmental	 degradation.	Our	 findings	
resonate	with	this	standpoint:	Strong	governance	could	lead	to	more	
IAS	through	its	ability	to	 improve	the	efficiency	with	which	a	nation	
introduces	 IAS.	Conversely,	 strong	 governance	does	not	 necessarily	
mean	that	existing	legislation	for	tackling	IAS	has	always	been	effec-
tive.	For	example,	the	1951	International	Plant	Protection	Convention	
has	evidently	been	ineffectual	at	slowing	the	spread	of	pests,	and	the	
Convention	on	Biological	Diversity	(CBD)	requires	parties	to	take	ac-
tions	against	IAS,	but	countries	are	not	sanctioned	for	failing	to	com-
ply	with	these	directives	(Keller,	Geist,	Jeschke,	&	Kühn,	2011).	In	the	
case	of	the	EU,	while	the	CBD’s	Article	on	IAS	was	adopted	 into	an	
EU	Strategy	for	Biodiversity	 (European	Commission	2011),	EU	legis-
lation	targeting	IAS	only	came	into	effect	in	January	2015	(Genovesi,	
Carboneras,	Vilà,	&	Walton,	2014).	Furthermore,	only	55%	of	coun-
tries	that	are	signatory	to	the	CBD	have	national	legislation	relevant	to	
IAS	(McGeoch	et	al.,	2010).	Even	where	national	IAS	policies	such	as	
black	lists	are	established,	their	heterogeneity	across	countries	under-
mines	its	effectiveness	(García-	de-	Lomas	&	Vilà,	2015).
Environmental	governance	was	not	part	of	this	analysis,	as	the	EPI	
only	began	in	2000	(Hsu	et	al.,	2014),	which,	because	of	invasion	debt	
(see	Methods),	is	not	a	sufficiently	long	period	of	time	to	confidently	
assess	 the	 impact	 of	 EPI	 on	 invasions.	 However,	 for	 the	 countries	
under	 analysis,	 2013	 EPI	 scores	weakly	 correlated	with	 2013	WGI	
estimates	 (rs	=	.363,	n	=	38,	p	=	.025),	 further	 supporting	 the	 finding	
by	Ceddia	et	al.	(2014)	that	strong	conventional	governance	does	not	
equal	strong	environmental	governance.	Future	analyses	would	bene-
fit	by	exploring	the	environmental	dimensions	of	governance,	and	we	
expect	that,	within	GDP	groups,	countries	with	better	environmental	
governance	will	show	reduced	DAISIE	100	scores.
While	the	explanations	discussed	so	far	address	the	positive	asso-
ciation	between	governance	and	DAISIE	100	scores	in	the	majority	of	
Eurasian	countries	studied	 (U/UM/M	group	countries),	 for	countries	
with	the	lowest	GDP	included	in	the	analysis	(L	group	countries),	our	
model	 indicated	a	negative	 relationship,	whereby	better	governance	
associated	with	 reduced	 DAISIE	 100	 scores	 (Figure	2).	We	 suggest	
that	this	relationship	might	be	the	result	of	a	balance	between	GDP	
(which	 correlates	with	 trade	and	 thus	 increases	propagule	pressure)	
and	governance	 (which,	 if	effective,	might	decrease	propagule	pres-
sure	through	proper	control	and	regulation	of	vectors	and	pathways	of	
TABLE  1 Best	models	(∆I <	6)	predicting	DAISIE	100	scores	in	Eurasian	countries
Model rank Intercept Gov:GDP Governance GDP Area Insularity PopDen Road density Continentality Precipitation Temperature K Log- likelihood AICc ∆i Adj. R
2
1 10.67	±	1.21 4.98	±	2.83 4.87	±	4.49 2.94	±	0.79 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 4 −101.20 214.3 0 0.667
2 11.11	±	1.35 4.99	±	2.79 5.71	±	4.59 2.72	±	0.84 NA + NA NA NA NA NA 5 −100.07 214.9 0.59 0.677
3 10.69	±	1.21 4.43	±	3.04 4.60	±	4.52 2.89	±	0.80 NA NA 0.60	±	1.20 NA NA NA NA 5 −100.61 215.9 1.67 0.668
4 11.17	±	1.35 4.34	±	2.98 5.48	±	4.58 2.63	±	0.85 NA + 0.70	±	1.18 NA NA NA NA 6 −99.23 216.2 1.92 0.681
5 10.68	±	1.22 4.71	±	2.92 3.80	±	5.17 3.35	±	1.24 −0.49	±	1.15 NA NA NA NA NA NA 5 −100.77 216.3 1.99 0.665
6 11.13	±	1.36 4.70	±	2.87 4.59	±	5.21 3.15	±	1.26 −0.52	±	1.13 + NA NA NA NA NA 6 −99.56 216.9 2.59 0.676
7 11.44	±	1.40 NA 10.44	±	4.84 NA 2.78	±	0.93 + 3.98	±	1.35 NA NA NA NA 5 −101.75 218.2 3.95 0.647
8 11.27	±	1.37 3.66	±	3.42 8.73	±	9.07 0.95	±	4.14 1.79	±	4.30 + 2.51	±	4.52 NA NA NA NA 7 −98.79 218.5 4.28 0.679
9 10.70	±	1.23 4.11	±	3.47 6.10	±	8.76 2.10	±	4.02 0.86	±	4.27 NA 1.46	±	4.46 NA NA NA NA 6 −100.51 218.8 4.49 0.659
10 10.84	±	1.29 NA 9.88	±	4.98 NA 3.07	±	0.90 NA 4.15	±	1.49 NA NA NA NA 5 −103.68 219.2 4.97 0.621
Models	ranked	by	increasing	AICc.	Coefficient	estimates	and	95%	CI	shown.	Gov:GDP,	Governance-	GDP	interaction;	PopDen,	Population	Density;	 
K,	Number	of	fitted	parameters	(including	intercept	and	residual	variance);	∆I,	Difference	between	AICc	value	of	the	best	model	and	other	models;	 
Adj. R2,	Coefficient	of	determination,	adjusted	for	the	number	of	parameters.
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introduction).	Countries	with	lower	GDP	likely	have	less	international	
trade,	which	 in	 turn	 reduces	 their	 rate	of	 IAS	 introduction.	This	 low	
level	 of	 propagule	 pressure	might	mean	 strong	 governance	 is	 capa-
ble	of	stemming	the	flow	of	incoming	IAS.	Strengthening	governance	
may	therefore	lead	to	differential	outcomes	in	countries	with	high	or	
low	GDP:	in	countries	with	lower	GDP,	stronger	governance	might	be	
associated	with	a	reduced	environmental	footprint,	whereas	in	coun-
tries	with	higher	GDP,	stronger	governance	might	be	associated	with	
greater	opportunities	to	exploit	the	environment	more	efficiently.	This	
theory,	however,	needs	to	be	empirically	tested.
Many	conservationists	assume	strengthening	governance	will	as-
sist	conservation	interventions	(Peh,	2013;	Smith	&	Walpole,	2005).	
Our	own	 results	partially	 support	 this	 claim—governance	policies	 in	
many	Eurasian	countries	of	smaller	economy	appear	to	have	the	ben-
eficial	effect	of	reducing	the	spread	of	IAS.	This	hints	toward	a	key	gap	
in	current	approaches	to	conservation	policy.	For	example,	the	recent	
adoption	of	EU	Regulation	1143/2014	on	IAS	aims	to	generate	a	co-
ordinated	response	to	high-	risk	IAS.	Such	siloed	approach	is	therefore	
F IGURE  2 Effect	of	governance	on	DAISIE	100	scores	was	
mediated	by	a	country’s	GDP.	Low-	GDP	countries	(L)	showed	
decreasing	scores	with	increasing	governance,	as	illustrated	by	the	
dashed	line	(-	-	-	)	which	represents	the	model	output	for	the	lowest	
GDP	country.	In	contrast,	richer	countries	(U/UM/M)	suffered	
from	increasing	scores	with	better	governance,	as	illustrated	by	
the	unbroken	line	(—)	which	represents	the	model	output	for	the	
highest	GDP	country.	Governance	scores	were	centered	to	mean.	
Regression	lines	were	drawn	from	parameter	estimates	in	the	best	
model	(∆I =	0,	Table	1);	M/UM	lines	used	the	categories’	median	GDP	
value.	Country	abbreviations	are	ISO	two-	letter	codes:	AL	(Albania);	
AT	(Austria);	BE	(Belgium);	BG	(Bulgaria);	BY	(Belarus);	CY	(Cyprus);	
Czech	Republic	(CZ);	DE	(Germany);	DK	(Denmark);	EE	(Estonia);	ES	
(Spain);	FI	(Finland);	FR	(France);	GB	(United	Kingdom);	GR	(Greece);	
HR	(Croatia);	HU	(Hungary);	IE	(Ireland);	IL	(Israel);	IS	(Iceland);	IT	
(Italy);	LT	(Lithuania);	LU	(Luxembourg);	LV	(Latvia);	MD	(Moldova);	
MT	(Malta);	NL	(the	Netherlands);	NO	(Norway);	PL	(Poland);	PT	
(Portugal);	RO	(Romania);	RS	(Serbia);	RU	(Russia);	SE	(Sweden);	SK	
(Slovakia);	SI	(Slovenia);	TR	(Turkey);	UA	(Ukraine)
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insufficient	 to	 attain	 the	 highest	 possible	 environmental	 outcomes,	
and	our	findings	reinforce	the	call	 to	tackle	 IAS	broadly	on	multiple	
fronts,	including	both	socioeconomic,	governance,	and	environmental	
policy.
A	related	policy	implication	is	that	high-	GDP	countries	with	rela-
tively	stronger	governance	are	expected	to	be	more	vulnerable	to	the	
introduction	of	new	IAS.	To	overcome	this	enhanced	susceptibility	to	
novel	IAS,	high-	GDP	countries	with	strong	governance	should	devote	
greater	resources	to	preventing	their	introduction.
Our	findings	suggest	that	the	notion	of	strong	governance	as	an	
ally	to	conservation	might	mask	the	true	complexity	of	the	relation-
ship	 between	 governance	 and	 biodiversity	 loss	 (Katzner,	 2005);	 fa-
vorable	conservation	outcomes	are	not	always	associated	with	good	
governance.	Whilst	current	conservation	activities	have	paid	attention	
to	 drivers	 of	 IAS	 such	 as	 trade	 and	 human	 movement,	 the	 under-	
researched	relationship	between	governance	and	biodiversity	means	
little	action	has	been	taken	to	address	the	 impact	of	governance	on	
the	spread	of	IAS.	Resolving	the	interactions	between	governance	and	
biodiversity	will	reveal	a	greater	understanding	of	the	socioeconomic	
drivers	of	biodiversity	loss,	allowing	future	interventions	to	tackle	this	
underappreciated	aspect	of	conservation.
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